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1. Introduction
It is a truism that the implementation of the law of the European Union chiefly
occurs in a decentralized fashion by the authorities of the Member States. The
resulting potential for divergent interpretations and complete or partial
failures to give full force to EU law in the Member States’ legal orders
constitutes the main challenge to its uniform application and efficiency. For
this reason, the availability of well-functioning and effective enforcement
mechanisms is crucial. The Treaties only explicitly stipulate public
enforcement through the infringement proceedings provided for in Articles
258–260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Private
means of enforcing EU law, such as the doctrine of direct effect or the rules on
Member State liability for infringements of EU law, first needed to be
developed by the Court of Justice.1
While public enforcement initiated by the European Commission or
another Member State is usually motivated by a desire to ascertain the full
application of European Union law, private enforcement by way of disputes
brought by individual claimants to the Member State courts is usually
privately motivated by a desire to obtain a remedy. Nonetheless, the remedies
developed by the ECJ, in particular Member State liability, which made its
first appearance just over 20 years ago in Francovich,2 are regarded as
(private) mechanisms for the enforcement of EU law. The argument is that
remedies provided to private parties, who use them to pursue their own
interests, act as a vehicle to achieve greater overall compliance with European
Union law. This is particularly evident from the ECJ’s reasoning in
Francovich. Apart from the protection of individual rights, the Court put an
emphasis on the contention that without Member State liability in case of a
failure to transpose a Directive in time, the full effectiveness of European
1. Starting with Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, [1963] ECR 1.
2. Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, Francovich and Bonifaci, [1991] ECR I-5357.
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Union law would be impaired.3 The Court additionally referred to the duty of
loyal cooperation laid down inArticle 4(3) TFEU,4 which is a duty relating to
the relationship between the Union and theMember States. Thus by providing
a route to obtain individual compensation and at the same time helping ensure
the full effectiveness of EU law, Member State liability is given a dual
purpose.5 Caranta even went so far as to suggest that individual judicial
protection in such cases was “no more than an implication of the principle of
full effects of [EU] law, as such to be used more to exact obedience from
Member States than to protect citizens.”6 As is well known, the Court in
Brasserie du Pêcheur extended the remedy beyond the context of directives to
any sufficiently serious breach of EU law and first pronounced the still valid
test for a State liability claim: the rule of EU law breached must be intended to
confer rights upon individuals, there must be a sufficiently serious breach of
that rule and a direct causal link between the breach and the damage
sustained.7 In Köbler, the ECJ later extended the doctrine of Member State
liability to also cover breaches by the judiciary where the infringement of
European Union law was manifest.8
The introduction and expansion of the State liability remedy arguably helps
to compensate for the weaknesses of public enforcement by the European
Commission. The criticism levied against the infringement procedure is well
rehearsed, so it suffices here to flag up the main points.Although about half of
all infringement procedures initiated by the European Commission in 2010
originated in complaints by individuals or companies,9 the European
Commission enjoys unlimited discretion as to which cases to bring before the
ECJ10 enabling the Commission to pursue a policy of selective enforcement.11
This is coupled with a lack of transparency during the pre-litigation stage of
3. Ibid., para 33; Caranta, “Judicial protection against Member States:A new jus commune
takes shape”, 32 CML Rev. (1995), 725; Schockweiler, “La responsabilité de l’autorité
nationale en cas de violation du droit communautaire”, 28 RTDE (1992), 42.
4. Joined Cases C-46 & 48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, [1996] ECR I-1029,
para 39.
5. Steiner, “From direct effects to Francovich: Shifting means of enforcement of
Community law”, (1993) EL Rev., 11.
6. Caranta, op. cit. supra note 3, 725.
7. Brasserie du Pêcheur, cited supra note 4, para 4.
8. Case C-224/01, Köbler v. Austria, [2003] ECR I-10239, para 53.
9. European Commission, “28thAnnual Report on Monitoring theApplication of EU Law
(2010)”, COM(2011)588 final, 3.
10. Case 247/87, Star Fruit v.Commission, [1989] 291, para 11; the European Ombudsman
is making efforts to make the Commission more accountable in this respect, for instance by
asking it to give reasons, e.g. in its decision on complaint 3307/2006/(PB)JMA against the
European Commission, available at <www.ombudsman.europa.eu>.
11. Rawlings, “Engaged elites citizen action and institutional attitudes in Commission
enforcement”, 6 ELJ (2000), 10.
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infringement proceedings as regards access to documents, the non-disclosure
of the Commission’s reasoned opinion or pleadings submitted to the Court of
Justice.12 This has led the European Parliament to express its concern that the
Commission’s alleged leniency would endanger the rule of law.13
Furthermore, the procedure has a reputation for being elitist rather than
participatory even though improvements regarding the European
Commission’s treatment of individual complaints have mitigated this.14 The
effectiveness of infringement proceedings is considerably hampered in that
they merely result in a declaratory judgment so that Member States will not
necessarily discharge their duty under Article 260(1) TFEU to remove the
infringement. Even the threat of pecuniary penalties, for the imposition of
which the Commission can apply, does not guarantee compliance.15 In
addition, public enforcement by theMember States underArticle 259TFEU is
virtually never used.16
While many of the weaknesses of the infringement procedure have been
addressed over the years, private enforcement is still regarded as having the
potential to substantially complement it. The underlying rationale of this
assumption has been pronounced by the ECJ very early on in Van Gend en
Loos with regard to direct effect:
“The vigilance of individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts to
an effective supervision in addition to the supervision entrusted by [Art.
258 and 259 TFEU] to the diligence of the Commission and the Member
States.”17
Focusing on the cases decided in the twenty years following the Francovich
decision, this article attempts to test the assumption that the remedy of
Member State liability is a useful and welcome additional tool to enhance
12. This lack of transparency was criticized by the European Parliament in its “Report on
the 25th annual report from the Commission on monitoring the application of Community law
(2007)”, A6-0245/2009, paras. 13 et seq.
13. European Parliament, “Report on the Commission’s 21st and 22nd Annual reports on
monitoring the application of Community law (2003 and 2004)”, A6-0089/2006, para 13; a
similar criticism was voiced by Smith, “Enforcement, monitoring, verification, outsourcing:
The decline and decline of the infringement process”, (2008) EL Rev., 777.
14. Harlow and Rawlings, “Accountability and law enforcement: The centralised EU
infringement procedure”, (2006) EL Rev., 447.
15. Craig and De Búrca,EULaw, 5th ed. (OUP, 2011), p. 414; Chalmers, Davies andMonti,
European Union Law, 2nd ed. (CUP, 2010), p. 345; Wennerås, “Sanctions against Member
States under Article 260 TFEU: Alive but not kicking?”, 49 CML Rev. (2012), 145.
16. So far, there have only been four such cases: Case 141/78, France v. United Kingdom,
[1979] ECR2923; Case C-388/95,Belgium v. Spain, [2000] ECR I-3123; Case C-145/05, Spain
v. United Kingdom, [2006] ECR I-7917; Case C-364/10, Hungary v. Slovakia (pending).
17. Van Gend en Loos, cited supra note 1.
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Member State compliance with their obligations under EU law. For this
purpose, the application of the law on Member State liability by the courts of
England18 and Germany is scrutinized. The first part of this article presents
and examines statistical data which shows that only few cases have been
successful so far.The second part provides a detailed discussion as regards the
grounds for the denial of such claims by both English and German courts and
an assessment of the soundness of these decisions. It will be shown that the
suitability of Francovich claims as a means of private enforcement is
overestimated and it is suggested to primarily regard the remedy as a means of
compensating private parties for tort suffered.
2. Twenty years of Francovich: Some statistical findings
2.1. Method
Before presenting the statistical findings on the treatment of the Francovich
line of case law in English and German courts, it is necessary to establish on
which methodical basis these findings were made. In November 2011, the
Francovich decision “celebrated” its 20th anniversary. This article is based on
the developments during those twenty years. Consequently, it only takes into
account decisions handed down before the end of 2011. The reason for
choosing the jurisdictions of Germany and England for this exercise is that
taken together the two account for almost half of all references made to the
ECJ in questions related to Member State liability. By the end of 2011, the
ECJ had decided thirty-three preliminary references involving questions
of Member State liability.19 Seven of these cases originated in
18. Note that the United Kingdom comprises three legal systems: England and Wales,
Scotland and Northern Ireland. This article limits itself to comparing Germany with England
and Wales.
19. Francovich and Bonifaci, cited supra note 2: this decision gave rise to two follow-up
references, which have not been counted separately: Joined Cases C-94 & 95/95, Bonifaci and
Berto, [1997] ECR I-3969 and Case C-373/95, Maso, [1997] ECR I-4051; Brasserie du
Pêcheur and Factortame, cited supra note 4; Case C-392/93, British Telecom, [1996] ECR
I-1631; Case C-5/94,Hedley Lomas, [1996] ECR I-2553; Joined Cases C-178, 179, 188, 189 &
190/94, Dillenkofer and others, [1996] ECR I-4845; Joined Cases C-283, 291 & 292/94,
Denkavit, [1996] ECR I-5063; Case C-127/95, Norbrook Laboratories, [1998] ECR I-1531;
Case C-261/95, Palmisani, [1997] ECR I-4025; Case C-319/96, Brinkmann, [1998] ECR
I-5255; C-140/97,Rechberger, [1999] ECR I-3499; CaseC-302/97,Konle, [1999] ECR I-3099;
Case C-424/97, Haim, [2000] ECR I-5123; Joined Cases C-397 & 410/98,
Metallgesellschaftand Hoechst, [2001] ECR I-1727; Case C-150/99, Stockholm Lindöpark,
[2001] ECR I-493; Case C-118/00, Larsy, [2001] ECR I-5063; Case C-63/01, Evans, [2003]
ECR I-14447; Köbler, cited supra note 8; Case C-222/02, Paul, [2004] ECR I-9425; Case
C-173/03, Traghetti del Mediterraneo, [2006] ECR I-5177; Case C-470/03,A.G.M.-COS.MET,
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German courts20 and nine in English courts.21 In view of the size of the legal
systems of England and Germany and on the basis of the large number of
references originating there, one can assume that there is sufficient litigation
in these countries to allow for conclusions to be drawn as regards the overall
success ofMember State liability under EU law.A further reason for choosing
these two jurisdictions was that neither of them avails of a domestic system of
State liability which would be able to deal with situations typically triggering
Member State liability under EU law. English law does not have a separate
State liability regime. Rather, claimants are restricted to making claims based
on ordinary torts, such as negligence, misfeasance in a public office or breach
of a statutory duty. There is no general principle that action ultra vires or
invalid administrative acts alone give rise to a claim.22 Thus when it comes to
the failure to comply with EU law obligations, the conditions for these torts
will usually be hard to satisfy.This is evident from the decision of the Court of
Appeal in Bourgoin S.A. v.Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Foodwhich
held that not every infringement of EU law constitutes a tort.23 Moreover,
English law does not provide for a tort-based claim for violations brought
about by the legislature.24
German tort law on the other hand provides for compensation where an
official breaches an official duty.25 However, this is only the case where the
duty breached is incumbent upon the State in relation to a third party. This
restriction has led the German courts to deny any claims based on legislative
action, since the legislature only ever acts in the interest of the public and not
[2007] ECR I-2749; Case C-511/03, Ten Kate, [2005] ECR I-8979; Case 446/04, Test
Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, [2006] ECR I-11753; Case C-524/04, Test Claimants in
the Thin Cap Group Litigation, [2007] ECR I-2107; Case C-278/05, Robins, [2007] ECR
I-1053; Case C-445/06, Danske Slagterier, [2009] ECR I-2119; Case C-452/06, Synthon,
[2008] ECR I-7681; Case C-118/08, Transportes Urbanos, [2010] ECR I-635; Case C-568/08,
Combinatie Spijker Infrabrouw, judgement of 9 Dec. 2010, nyr; Case C-243/09, Fuß, judgment
of 14 Oct. 2010, nyr; Case C-279/09, DEB, judgment of 22 Dec. 2010, nyr; Case C-94/10,
Danfoss, 20Oct. 2011, nyr.The cases ofFrancovich and Bonifaci andBrasserie du Pêcheur and
Factortame were counted as two cases respectively because the references had been made by
different courts.
20. Brasserie du Pêcheur, cited supra note 4; Denkavit, Dillenkofer, Haim, Paul, Danske
Slagterier, DEB, all cited supra note 19.
21. Factortame, cited supra note 4, British Telecom, Hedley Lomas, Metallgesellschaft,
Evans, Robins, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap
Group Litigation, Synthon, all cited supra note 19; the case of Norbrook originated in Northern
Ireland and not in England, so it was not included here.
22. Craig, Administrative Law, 6th ed. (Sweet&Maxwell, 2008), p. 957.
23. Borgouin S. A. and Others v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, [1986]
QB 716.
24. Steiner, op. cit. supra note 5, 14.
25. Para 839 BGB (German Civil Code).
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in the interest of individuals.26 Furthermore, German law contains a fault
requirement, i.e. the official must have acted intentionally or negligently.As a
result, the mere fact that an official has acted illegally does not suffice to
establish a claim based on this tort. In addition, there is an evenmore restricted
liability of the State for violations by the judicial branchwhere a responsibility
for judgments handed down only arises where the judge commits a criminal
offence when handing down judgment.27
Thus, neither English nor German law themselves provide a claim in many
cases where individuals are seeking reparation for damages resulting from
breaches of European Union law. This is because typical State liability claims
are based on legislative misconduct, e.g. problems with the implementation of
directives or the adoption of legislation contrary to EU law. Furthermore, such
claims will often be unable to establish fault, as the legal situation may have
been complex so that an official’s illegal action may be excusable. Since
neither German nor English law can accommodate these typical cases, one
should expect ample litigation based on the EU law remedy.
The sample consists of cases which either directly or indirectly decided on
a claim of Member State liability. Cases in which a court merely mentioned
the possibility of such a claim in passing were not considered, e.g. where a
court denied a claim based on an allegedly directly effective directive but
mentioned that there might potentially be a claim against the State under
Francovich.28 Likewise, cases in which a court held that it had no jurisdiction
to hear a State liability case were not counted.29 The same is true for cases in
which declarations were sought that there was a breach of EU law in order to
prepare a State liability claim.30 In contrast, cases concerning legal aid in view
of a later State liability claimwere included since the courts are asked to make
an assessment as to the chances of success such a claim might have.31
Decisions which were appealed have only been counted as one case (even
though there may have been multiple decisions). Where an appeal was
pending at the end of 2011, the decision of the last court deciding was taken
into consideration. Cases are considered successful where Member State
liability was actually established and damages had to be paid.
The following results should be assessedwith the limitations of this study in
mind. The first limitation is that the study is based on cases, which have been
26. Cf. the referencemade by the Federal Court of Justice inBrasserie du Pêcheur, BGH III
ZR 127/91.
27. § 839(2) BGB.
28. E.g. in Churchill Insurance Co Ltd v. Wilkinson, [2010] EWCA Civ 556.
29. E.g. inMann v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment, [1998] Eu.L.R. 388.
30. E.g in R. v. Secretary of State for Employment Ex p. Seymour-Smith (No.1), [1997] 1
W.L.R. 473; OVG Rheinland-Pfalz6 A 11131/10; OVG Nordrhein-Westfalen 4A17/08.
31. E.g. KG Berlin 9 W 50/08; LG München 15 O 23548/08.
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made publicly accessible either through databases32 or in other forms such as
collections and digests of case law. This means that there may be a limited
number of judgments which were never reported and therefore were not
considered. Moreover, the number of cases settled outside court is unclear. It
is very likely that such settlements have occurred in the past. This is for
instance evidenced by the events following the ECJ’s Dillenkofer decision,33
when about 7,800 individuals were paid compensation totalling about 10
million euro.34 It is highly likely that some of the references made by English
or German courts, where there has been no follow-up decision by the referring
domestic court, resulted in settlements.35 For a government, the incentive to
agree to such a settlement is great where it sees itself losing the case. It may
avoid a judgment from being published and thereby prevent copycat claims.
Furthermore, it may save on legal costs and a quick out-of court settlement
may incentivize the claimant to accept a smaller sum than the actual damage
sustained.
The other limit is that the results only concern two Member States and
cannot therefore be determinative of the situation in otherMember States. It is
submitted that in view of the low number of preliminary references from other
Member States, except perhaps Italy, it is likely that the situation in those other
Member States does not differ greatly. But it is hoped that the results presented
here motivate further study. One might in particular focus whether and in how
far established national State liability regimes have contributed to the
enforcement of EU law. One candidate might be the Netherlands where it is
not necessary to establish a sufficiently serious breach in order to establish
liability for failure to implement an EU Directive.36 Other countries which
warrant further in-depth study are Italy and Greece, against which the
Commission has initiated high numbers of infringement cases over the past
twenty years.37 This would suggest that a large number of breaches of EU law
have happened in these countries and consequently a large number of State
liability claims may have been made, too. Nonetheless it is suggested that the
results found here are strong indicators of the situation in all Member States.
32. For England, the study relied onWestlaw, LexisNexis and BAILII; for Germany it relied
on <juris.de> and Beck-online.
33. Dillenkofer, cited supra note 19.
34. Cf. the answer given by the Federal Government in the Bundestag, Deutscher Bundestag
Plenarprotokoll of 16 Oct. 1996, 13. Wahlperiode, 130.Sitzung.
35. For details see infra.
36. Cf. Besselink, case note onWaterpakt (Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad
der Nederlanden), 21 March 2003, Civil Chamber, No. C01/327HR.1 Stichting Waterpakt,
Stichting Natuur en Milieu, Vereniging Consumentenbond and three others v. State of the
Netherlands), 41 CML Rev. (2004), 1430.
37. European Commission, “28thAnnual Report onMonitoring theApplication of EULaw
(2010)” SEC(2011)1094 final, Annex I.
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This suggestion finds support in a study on the application of State liability
law by national courts comprising more countries, which is available on the
website of the Asser Institute.38 In particular with a view to the repeat
offenders Greece and Italy the study does not reveal huge amounts of national
litigation. For Greece, it only cites one case, which it considers a blatant
defiance of ECJ case law, and for Italy it refers to a total of six cases decided
between 1998 and 2004.
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Success rate in England
In the twenty years following Francovich, twenty-two cases concerning
Member State liability were decided by English courts.39 English courts made
references to the ECJ in three further cases, for which no further decision by
the domestic courts could be traced.40 These three cases have been added to
the total number, resulting in twenty-five decisions overall. Out of these
twenty-five cases, seven resulted in convictions by an English court.The three
further cases in which a reference had been made but where no further
decision followed, were probably settled out of court. In two of these, Hedley
38. See <www.asser.nl/Default.aspx?site_id=7&level1=12219&level2=12237> [accessed
25 June 2012].
39. The total number of decisions is 35 (including decisions by lower courts, which were
appealed); the (final) decisions are: Boyd Line Management Services Ltd v. Ministry of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (No.1), [1999] Eu. L.R. 44; FJ Chalke Ltd v. Revenue and
Customs Commissioners, [2009] EWHC 952 (Ch); Byrne v. Motor Insurers’ Bureau, [2008]
EWCA Civ 574; Cooper v. Attorney General, [2010] EWCA Civ 464; Evans v. Secretary of
State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, [2001] EWCA Civ 32; R. v. Secretary of
State for Transport Ex p. Factortame Ltd (No.5), [2000] 1A.C. 524; R. v. Secretary of State for
Transport Ex p. Factortame Ltd (No.6), [2001] 1 W.L.R. 942; R. v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department Ex p. Gallagher, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 951; Sayers v. Cambridgeshire CC,
[2006] EWHC 2029 (QB); R. v. Department of Social Security Ex p. Scullion, [1999] 3
C.M.L.R. 798; Spencer v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, [2008] EWCA Civ 750;
Moore v. Secretary of State for Work and Transport, [2008] EWCA Civ 750; Phonographic
Performance Ltd v. Department of Trade and Industry, [2004] EWHC 1795 (Ch); Harmon
CFEM Facades (UK) Ltd v. Corporate Officer of the House of Commons, 67 Con. L.R. 1;
Bowden v. SouthWestWater Services Ltd, [1998] 3 C.M.L.R. 330; R. (on the application of MK
(Iran)) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2010] EWCA Civ 115; R. (on the
application of Negassi) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2011] EWHC 386
(Admin); Three Rivers DC v. Bank of England (No.3), [2003] 2A.C. 1; Test Claimants in the FII
Group Litigation v. Revenue and Customs Commissioners, [2010] EWCA Civ 103; Test
Claimants in Thin Cap Group Litigation v. Revenue and Customs Commissioners, [2011]
EWCA Civ 127; Sempra Metals Ltd (formerly Metallgesellschaft Ltd) v. Inland Revenue
Commissioners, [2007] UKHL 34; R v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Ex p. Lay
and Gage, [1998] C.O.D. 387.
40. These are Robins, Hedley Lomas and Synthon, all cited supra note 19.
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Lomas and Synthon, the ECJ had found a sufficiently serious breach41 so that
they have been counted as successful. In the remaining case of Robins, the
establishment of a sufficiently serious breach was left to the referring court,
but the ECJ had pointed to the “considerable discretion” available to the
Member State.42 Thus it is unlikely that this case would have been successful.
Fifteen of the twenty-five cases dealt with the failure to either implement or
apply a directive properly,43 six cases concerned violations of primary law,44
three cases concerned regulations45 and one case dealt with a Köbler claim.46
In four of the cases concerning directives, Directive 84/5/EEC was at issue.47
The claimants in thirteen cases under review pursued commercial interests
and most were companies; in twelve cases the claimants were individuals, of
whom one was a representative of a pressure group. In one of these twelve
cases, one of about four-hundred claimants was a District Council.48 Overall,
this results in a total of nine successful cases out of a total of twenty-five,
which amounts to a success rate of 36 percent.
2.2.2. Success rate in Germany
During the same period German courts decided thirty-four cases directly or
indirectly49 based on the Francovich line of case law.50 In addition, there are
three cases in which German courts made a reference but where no further
decision can be traced. This raises the total number of cases to thirty-seven.
41. Hedley Lomas and Synthon, cited supra note 19.
42. Robins, cited supra note 19, para 74.
43. Chalke; Byrne; Evans; Gallagher; Sayers; Scullion; Spencer; Moore; Phonographic;
Bowden;Negassi; Three Rivers, all cited supra note 39;Hedley Lomas; Robins and Synthon, all
cited supra note 19.
44. Factortame No. 5; Factortame No. 6; Harmon; Test Claimants in the FII Group
Litigation; Test Claimants in Thin Cap Group Litigation; Sempra, all cited supra note 39.
45. Boyd; MK; Lay and Gage, all cited supra note 39.
46. Cooper, cited supra note 39.
47. Second Council Directive 84/5/EEC of 30 Dec. 1983 on the approximation of the laws
of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor
vehicles, O.J. 1984, L 8/17; see the casesByrne;Evans; Spencer;Moore, all cited supra note 39.
48. Three Rivers DC, cited supra note 39.
49. E.g. legal aid proceedings.
50. OLG Frankfurt, 1 U 244/07; LG Berlin 23 O 44/08; BGH III ZR 140/09; LG Berlin 23
O 503/07; BGH III ZR 48/01; LG Bonn 1 O 186/98; LG Bonn 1 O 5/99; BGH III ZR 233/07;
BGH III ZR 294/03; KG Berlin 9W 50/08; LGMünchen 15 O 23548/08; BGH III ZR 144/05;
BGH IX ZR 210/10; LG Bonn 1 O 320/93 (settled out of court); OLGKöln 7 U 23/97; BGH III
ZR 127/91; BGH III ZR 358/03; LG Düsseldorf 2b O 286/08; BGH III ZR 4/05; KG Berlin 9
U 10/08; LG Bonn 1 O 364/98; OLG Karlsruhe 12 U 286/05; BGH III ZR 337/09; OVG
Berlin-Brandenburg 4 B 13/11; OVG Hamburg 1 Bf 90/08; LG Hannover 14 O 57/10; OLG
München 1U 5279/10; OLGMünchen 1U 392/11; LGBochum5O5/11; LGKöln 5O 385/10;
KG Berlin 9 U 233/10; BGH III ZR 59/10; BVerwG 2 B 93/11; OLG Düsseldorf 18 U 111/10.
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One of these cases is Fuß,51 in which the national proceedings were still
pending by the end of 2011 before the HalleAdministrative Court.52 But from
other decisions based on Fuß, which were successful,53 one can infer thatFuß
itself was also a successful case.The two other references,Denkavit andHaim,
are considered unsuccessful. InDenkavit54 the ECJ did not find a sufficiently
serious breach so that it can be assumed that the case was not pursued any
further. In Haim, the ECJ held that the relevant breach of EU law occurred at
a time when the situation had not yet been elucidated by the Court.55 Despite
leaving the final decision on this point to the referring court, this was a strong
indicator that the breach was not serious, so that it is unlikely that the claim
was successful or successfully settled. Out of this total of thirty-seven cases,
eight resulted in convictions or in settlements out of court.56
Twenty-three of the German cases concerned directives,57 nine cases
concerned primary law58 and three cases were Köbler claims.59 Of all
claimants, seventeen were companies and twenty-two were individuals, some
of whom pursued commercial interests. As in England, German courts had to
deal with a number of repeat claims concerning the same alleged breach. Five
unsuccessful claims concerned the German ban on bets on sporting
competitions.60 The ECJ’s judgment in Fuß triggered a number of follow-up
cases of firemen requesting compensation for time worked in excess of the
limits laid down in theWorkingTime Directive.61 Thus in Germany there was
51. Fuß, cited supra note 19.
52. VG Halle, 5 A 180/10 HAL.
53. Fuß, cited supra note 19.
54. Denkavit, cited supra note 19.
55. Haim, cited supra note 19, para 47.
56. Notably, following the case of Dillenkofer, about 7800 individual claims were settled by
the Federal German Government, cf. the answer given by the Federal Government in the
Bundestag, Deutscher Bundestag Plenarprotokoll of 16 Oct. 1996, 13. Wahlperiode,
130.Sitzung.
57. LGBerlin 23 O 44/08; BGH III ZR 140/09; LGBerlin 23 O 503/07; BGH III ZR 48/01;
LG Bonn 1 O 186/98; LG Bonn 1 O 5/99; BGH III ZR 233/07; BGH III ZR 294/03; KG Berlin
9W50/08;BGH III ZR 144/05; BGH IXZR 210/10; LGBonn 1O 320/93 (settled out of court);
OLG Köln 7 U 23/97;BGH III ZR 358/03; LG Düsseldorf 2b O 286/08; BGH III ZR 4/05; KG
Berlin 9 U 10/08; LG Bonn 1 O 364/98; BGH III ZR 337/09; OVG Berlin-Brandenburg 4 B
13/11; OVG Hamburg 1 Bf 90/08; KG Berlin 9 U 233/10; BGH III ZR 59/10; BVerwG 2 B
93/11; Denkavit, cited supra note 19; Fuß, cited supra note 19.
58. LG München 15 O 23548/08; BGH III ZR 127/91; LG Hannover 14 O 57/10; OLG
München 1U 5279/10; OLGMünchen 1U 392/11; LGBochum5O5/11; LGKöln 5O 385/10;
OLG Düsseldorf 18 U 111/10; Haim, cited supra note 19.
59. OLG Frankfurt, 1 U 244/07; BGH III ZR 294/03; OLG Karlsruhe 12 U 286/05.
60. LG Hannover , 14 O 57/10; OLG München 1 U 5279/10 and 1 U 392/11; LG Bochum
5 O 5/11; LG Köln, 5 O 385/10.
61. OVG Berlin-Brandenburg, 4 B 13/11; OVG Hamburg 1 Bf 90/08; it is likely that more
cases are still pending and that a large number of cases have been settled out of court, cf. the
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a success rate of 22 percent. The main findings are summarized in the
following tables.
Table 1: Success rate of State liability proceedings 1992–2011
Cases brought in Overall number Successful Success rate
England 25 9 36%
Germany 37 8 22%
Table 2:Alleged violations (percentage of total)
Casesbrought in Directives Primary law Regulations Köbler
England 15 (60%) 6 (24%) 3 (12%) 1 (4%)
Germany 25(68%) 9 (24%) 0 3(8%)
Apart from the low overall number of State liability cases over the last twenty
years, it is noteworthy that in both England and Germany the vast majority of
cases dealt with issues surrounding the transposition of directives. Late
transposition in particular was also identified by the European Commission as
one of the key problems when it comes to the compliance with EU law.62 The
directive is thus the legislative instrument that is most likely to lead to
litigation. It will be shown in the second part of this article that national courts
are only willing to award damages in cases concerning directives where the
violation was clear, which reduces the suitability of the Francovich claim for
private enforcement.
2.3. Contrast: Infringements proceedings
Before analysing the results presented in the preceding section, it is
worthwhile contrasting the results with infringement proceedings brought by
the European Commission under Article 258 TFEU. In 2010, the European
Commission initiated 1289 new infringement cases63 while it was dealing
press release by the trade union ver.di, which suggests that there are thousands of claims
pending: <gemeinden.bb.verdi.de/berlin_-_fb_7/copy_of_fachgruppe_5_-_feuerwehr/data/
Feuerwehreinsatz-gegen-Mehrarbeit.pdf> accessed 29 Apr. 2012.
62. COM(2011)588, cited supra note 9, 5.
63. SEC(2011)1094 final, cited supra note 37, Annex I.
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with almost 2100 active cases at the end of that year.64 Of the newly detected
cases, thirty-one concerned Germany and seventy-five concerned the United
Kingdom.65 Of the overall number of cases under examination in 2010, 104
concerned Germany and 110 concerned the United Kingdom.66 Even though
more cases overall were initiated against the United Kingdom, only one was
subsequently referred to the ECJ in 2010 whereas seven were referred against
Germany.67 This suggests that the United Kingdom cooperates better with the
European Commission in removing the infringements at the pre-litigation
stage. This may help explain why the United Kingdom has been the subject of
infringement proceedings the Court of Justice to a much lesser extent than
Germany.
During the period from 1992 until 2010, ninety-seven litigious cases were
brought against the United Kingdom and two-hundred against Germany.68
The success rate of such proceedings is high. In the nine-year period between
2002 and 2010, for which statistics are available on the ECJ’s website,69
fifty-nine judgments were rendered against the United Kingdom. Only
thirteen of them were dismissed, resulting in a success rate of 78 percent of
cases. Seventy-six judgments were rendered in cases brought against
Germany, of which only nine were dismissed, resulting in a success rate of 88
percent. Before entering into a deeper analysis of these statistics, the sheer
contrast in numbers stands out. There was far more public enforcement
litigation against the United Kingdom and Germany than Francovich cases;
and the success rate of the former was considerably higher.
Table 3: comparison of proceedings (1992–2011)
Cases brought against Under Article 258
(success rate)70
State Liability (success
rate)
Germany 200 (88%) 37 (22%)
United Kingdom 97 (78%) 25 (36%)71
64. COM(2011)588, cited supra note 9, 3.
65. SEC(2011)1094 final, cited supra note 37, Annex I, Table 1.3 A.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid., Annex II, Table 2.1.
68. Court of Justice of the European Union, Annual reports 1992 –2010.
69. Ibid., Annual reports 2002–2010.
70. Based on success rate of judgments between 2002–2010.
71. Figures for England and Wales only.
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When looking at these figures, one needs to be aware that only a small fraction
of infringement proceedings initiated by the European Commission
actuallyresult in proceedings before the ECJ. In most cases, the infringement
is removed before the case reaches the Court.
Table 4: Infringement proceedings initiated by the Commission
2006–201072
Cases brought
against
Formal notice Reasoned Opinion Referral to ECJ
Germany 236 98 47
United Kingdom 304 109 26
Of course, these statistics do not reveal why the cases were resolved before
they had reached the stage of being referred to the ECJ. One explanation
would be that the Member States managed to convince the Commission that
there was no infringement after all. However, this seems unlikely. The more
probable explanation is that the Member States removed the infringement.
This is particularly likely because most proceedings are initiated because of
failures to communicate the transposition of directives,73 which in itself
constitutes an infringement.74
The main question for this paper is, of course, in how far Francovich is
likely to have contributed to the enforcement of European Union law. In view
of the statistics presented, the number of infringement proceedings in the
Court of Justice was almost five times greater than that of Francovich cases
decided in the domestic courts.75 If one also takes into account themuch larger
number of infringement proceedings initiated by the Commission, whichwere
not referred to the Court, the number of State liability cases is dwarfed. This
would suggest that in the overall picture of enforcement, Francovich type
cases are only of limited importance. Of course, it should be borne inmind that
not all types of infringements are suitable to be pursued through State liability
72. SEC(2011) 1094 final, cited supra note 37, Annex II, Table 2.1.
73. European Commission, “28thAnnual Report onMonitoring theApplication of EULaw
(2010)”, SEC(2011)1094 final, Annex I, Table 1.1.
74. Case 96/81, Commission v. Netherlands, [1982] ECR 1791.
75. Table 3; of course, the number of infringement proceedings has dropped significantly
from almost 3000 new cases in 2004 to slightly over 1200 in 2010, cf. SEC(2011) 1094 final,
cited supra note 37, Annex I, Table 1.1.
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claims, e.g. violations which do not affect the position of the individual. But
even if one accounted for a considerable percentage of infringement cases to
fall into that category, they would almost certainly still greatly outnumber
State liability claims.
As will be shown in the next part of this contribution, the criteria for a State
liability claim are very difficult to establish. In view of this and the resulting
low success rate of such claims compared with the success rate of proceedings
underArticle 258TFEU, it is usually worthwhile for the government to run the
risk of proceedings. Thus it is at least unlikely that the total number of cases
settled exceeds the number of overall judgments in these matters. For this
reason, one can conclude that the coffers of the Member States’ treasuries
have not been opened, as was feared by early commentators on Francovich.76
Another concern, which had been voiced byHarlow amongst others, is that the
claim for State liability might primarily benefit corporations and other
claimants with a commercial interest.77 The numbers have revealed that only
in about half of the cases have the claimants pursued commercial interests.
3. Analysis of German and English cases
As shown in the preceding section, actions forMember State liability initiated
in Germany and England are more often than not unsuccessful. It is thus appo-
site to examine why this is the case, in particular whether the conditions for
State liability are applied in the samemanner in both countries andwhether any
patterns of avoidance can be found. In order to enable such analysis, it is neces-
sary to establish the ground rules.Asmentioned in the introduction, a claim for
Member State liabilitymust satisfy three conditions: the rule infringedmust be
intended to confer rights on individuals, the breachmust be sufficiently serious
and there must be a causal link between the breach and the damage.78 As is
shown in the following table, the vast majority of claims fail because the na-
tional court was unable to establish a sufficiently serious breach.
76. Harlow, “Francovich and the problem of the disobedient State”, (1996) ELJ, 216.
77. Ibid., 205.
78. Brasserie du Pêcheur, cited supra note 4, para 51.
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Table 5: Reasons why claims failed in court
Total no.
of
unsuccess-
ful cases
Lack of
rule
conferring
rights on
individuals
No
sufficiently
serious
breach
No causal
link
Procedural
hurdle/no
damage/
unclear
England 16 1 (6%) 10 (63%) 1 (6%) 4 (25%)
Germany79 29 3 (10%) 18 (62%) 5 (17%) 3 (10%)
It will be shown that the criteria developed by the ECJ and applied by the
national courts are not suited to foster compliance with the law of the
European Union. Member State liability should thus be chiefly regarded as a
remedy for individuals whose rights under EU law have been gravely
disregarded by the Member States and not as a valuable tool for the private
enforcement of European rules.
3.1. Rule conferring rights on individuals
The finding of whether the rule concerned confers rights on individuals is
naturally a matter of interpreting European Union law. The Court’s approach
is chiefly purposive and generally wider than national concepts like the
German Schutznorm theory, which requires that an applicant must be a
member of a limited group of people distinguishable from the public at
large.80 But the Court of Justice has so far not provided a comprehensive
theory of rights in EU law.81 As a consequence, the Court’s approach when
reaching its findings differs slightly from case to case, which is illustrated by
the following examples. In Fuß the Court invoked an explicit reference to the
safety and health of workers in Article 6(b) of the Working Time Directive
2003/88 to conclude that the minimum requirements contained therein
conferred rights on workers.82 However, explicit reference to the individual in
79. In KG Berlin 9 U 233/10 the court was unable to find any one of the three conditions
present; this case was counted as a case where the rule did not confer rights on individuals
because the court only explored the other two conditions in an obiter dictum.
80. Prechal, “Protection of rights: How far?”, in Prechal andVanRoermund,TheCoherence
of EU Law (OUP, 2008), 158.
81. For an overview of the case law see Prechal, ibid., 159; Prechal, Directives in EC Law,
2nd ed. (OUP, 2005), pp. 97 et seq.
82. Fuß, cited supra note 19, paras. 49 and 33.
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the wording of a provision is not always necessary but can be sufficient. In
Brasserie the Court held it to bemanifest thatArticle 34TFEU,which contains
a prohibition on quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent
effect, is nonetheless capable of being intended to confer rights on
individuals.83 This can be contrasted with Ten Kate Holdingwhere it relied on
a literal approach to conclude that Article 265 TFEU did not impose an
obligation on aMember State to initiate proceedings against an EU institution
for failure to act.84 The Court also held that Article 4(3) TFEU did not confer
individual rights against aMember State since it only concernedmutual duties
between the Member States and EU institutions.85 This argument was less
clearly based on a literal interpretation but also pointed to earlier case law
where this had been established.
The requirement is not fulfilled in such amanifest way in all cases, however.
It is clear from Paul that the ECJ is prepared to conduct a much deeper
analysis. The Court was asked to decide whether certain directives conferred
rights on depositors to a proper supervision of banks. The Court employed
threemethods of interpretation. First, it adopted a literal approach holding that
the directives do not expressly grant such a right to depositors.86 Second, it
employed a systematic argument by referring to the limits of the EU’s
competence underArticle 64(2) TFEU to adopt harmonizing measures on the
movement of capital. Only measures which were necessary could be adopted.
Given that an individual right to effective supervision was not strictly
necessary to achieve the objective of the directives, such a right was held not
to be conferred by them.87 Third, the Court considered the purpose of the
provisions by stating that the directives only laid down a minimal protection
for depositors, which would also be guaranteed where supervision was
defective.88 It followed that a right to supervision was not necessary. This
reasoning in Paul shows that the first condition for the State liability claim is
not always easy to determine and that national courts need to employ the full
canon of interpretative methods in order to decide on this point. The case
suggests that it is not enough if a directivemakes reference to individuals in its
preamble but that it is necessary for this to be backed up by more specific
provisions so that the class of persons protected under the rule at issue can be
identified.89 Interestingly, inDanske Slagterier the ECJ applied amore lenient
test by referring to the fact that one of the objectives of the Directive in
83. Brasserie du Pêcheur, cited supra note 4, para 54.
84. Ten Kate, cited supra note 19, para 27.
85. Ibid., para 28.
86. Paul, cited supra note 19, para 41.
87. Ibid., paras. 42–43.
88. Ibid., para 44.
89. Prechal, op. cit. supra note 80, 167.
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question was the free movement of goods so that the Directive had to be
regarded as a concretization of the rights conferred under Article 28
TFEU, with the result that the provisions in question were deemed to confer
rights on individuals.90 The following discussion of two cases from Germany
and one from England will show that, perhaps unsurprisingly, there are
considerable variations in the quality of national court decisions on thematter.
In cases related to the Paul proceedings, the Landgericht (Regional Court)
Bonn adopted a sound and convincing approach and concluded that Article 7
of Directive 94/19/EC on deposit guarantee-schemes91 conferred rights on
individual depositors.92 The Landgericht pointed in particular to the right of
compensation for individuals explicitly provided for in the Directive. It
rejected a competence-based argument by the German State, which pointed to
the fact that the Directive was not based on the EU’s competences in the field
of consumer protection in what are now Articles 115 and 169 TFEU,93 but
rather on Article 60 TFEU. It held that the Directive’s legal basis in Article
60(2)TFEUdoes not necessarilymean that theDirective does not pursue other
goals, such as the protection of individuals, as well. The Landgericht based its
findings in particular on the recitals of the Directive, which explicitly refer to
consumer protection.
The Landgericht’s reasoning is evidence of a sound understanding of the
relevant legal principles. Yet there are cases where a similar degree of
understanding appeared to be lacking. An example is a case decided by the
Kammergericht (Higher Regional Court) Berlin on whether Article 13(B)(f)
of the SixthVATDirective 77/388/EEC conferred rights on individuals.94This
provision states that “betting, lotteries and other forms of gambling” are
exempt fromVAT subject to limitations laid down by eachMember State. The
ECJ had previously held that Germany was in violation of that Directive as it
had exempted public casinos fromVATwhereas privately-owned casinos were
subject to VAT.95 In subsequent State liability proceedings, the
Kammergericht held that the provision did not confer rights on individuals but
aimed to accomplish neutral taxation. Interestingly, this conclusion was
reached despite the fact that the ECJ had previously held the provision to be
directly effective.96 The question whether it is a condition for the direct effect
of a directive that a provision confers rights on individuals was long the
90. Danske Slagterier, cited supra note 19, paras. 21 et seq.
91. Directive 94/19/EC, O.J. 1994, L 135/5.
92. LG Bonn 1 O 186/98; LG Bonn 1 O 55/99.
93. Ex Arts. 100 and 129(a) TEC.
94. KG Berlin 9 U 233/10.
95. Joined Cases C-453 & 462/02, Linneweber and Akritidis, [2005] ECR I-1131.
96. Ibid., para 38.
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subject of academic debate.97 Prechal has convincingly argued that a provision
can be directly effective without conferring rights.98 At the same time she
concedes that the direct effect of a provision usually indicates that there is a
right conferred upon individuals.99 In fact, in a number of cases the ECJ had
explicitly stated that a provision in question conferred rights on individuals
precisely because it had direct effect.100 What is remarkable about the
Kammergericht’s judgment is that in its decision on the very point the ECJ had
explicitly stated that individuals can rely on provisions “in so far as they define
rights which individuals are able to assert against the State”.101There was thus
a strong indication from the ECJ that the provision in question was intended to
confer rights on individuals. The fact that the Kammergericht swiftly
dismissed the arguments advanced by the claimant at least suggests a general
unwillingness on the part of the court to grant damages, if not actually a
misapplication of the ECJ’s ruling.
The requirement that a provision of EU law must confer rights on
individuals also featured prominently in the English Three Rivers litigation.
The plaintiffs claimed that the Bank of England had failed to comply with its
supervisory duties under the First Banking Directive 77/780/EEC102 as a
result of which the plaintiffs lost their deposits in a fraudulent bank. The
plaintiffs failed to convince the courts at all instances that the Directive was
intended to confer rights on individuals. Lord Hope, who gave the leading
speech in the House of Lords, based his argument on the recitals of the
Directive and the wording of its articles and concluded that the Directive did
not confer rights on individuals.103 Furthermore, he considered its purpose to
be the coordination of the rules on banking supervision. The Paul decision,
handed down by the ECJ four years later, showed that the House of Lords
arrived at the correct conclusion. The Three Rivers case is chiefly instructive
because it revealed a reluctance on the part of the House of Lords to refer the
question to the ECJ.104 Lord Hope concluded that the question was “acte
clair” despite having dedicated sixteen page of his judgment to that very point
and despite the strong dissenting opinion byAuld LJ in the Court ofAppeal.105
97. For an overview cf. Prechal, op. cit. supra note 81, 99–106.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid, 126.
100. E.g. in Stockholm Lindöpark, cited supra note 18, para 35.
101. Linneweber and Akritidis, cited supra note 95, para 33, where the ECJ referred to its
earlier cases, such as Case 8/81, Becker, [1982] ECR 53.
102. Directive 77/780/EEC, O.J. 1977, L 332/30.
103. Three Rivers District Council and Others v. Governor and Company of the Bank of
England (No 3), [2000] 2 W.L.R. 1220.
104. This was also criticized by Fairgrieve and Andenas, “Misfeasance in public office,
governmental liability, and European influences”, (2002) ICLQ, 775.
105. Three Rivers DC, cited supra note 103, 2 W.L.R. 15.
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That the question was evidently not acte clair is obvious from the reference in
Paul. The Three Rivers decision thus reveals another weakness in the
conception of Member State liability as a tool for private decentralized
enforcement. Such enforcement can only work where Member State courts
view EU law remedies in the wider context of enforcement, which would
incentivize more references to the ECJ in critical cases such as Three Rivers.
The criterion that the provision breached must be intended to confer rights
on individuals has been shown not to be unproblematic. The main reason for
this is the lack of clear guidance from the ECJ as to what constitutes a right
under EU law. It is therefore not surprising that the national courts have had
difficulties in applying this criterion. Coupled with a lack of enthusiasm for
awarding State liability damages and for referring borderline cases to the ECJ,
this has the potential to hamper the suitability ofFrancovich claims as ameans
of enforcing European Union law.
3.2. Sufficiently serious breach
As shown in table 5, the most difficult condition for a claimant to establish is
that of a sufficiently serious breach.106 The main criterion is whether the
Member State had any discretion granted to it by EU lawwhen the breach was
committed. The more discretion is given to a Member State, the less likely is
the existence of a sufficiently serious breach.107 The court dealing with the
question must, in the ECJ’s own famous words, take the following factors into
account:
“… the clarity and precision of the rule breached, the measure of
discretion left by that rule to the national or [EU]authorities, whether the
infringement and the damage caused was intentional or involuntary,
whether any error of law was excusable or inexcusable, the fact that the
position taken by a [EU] institution may have contributed towards the
omission, and the adoption or retention of national measures or practices
contrary to [EU] law.
On any view, a breach of [EU] law will clearly be sufficiently serious
if it has persisted despite a judgment finding the infringement in
question to be established, or a preliminary ruling or settled case-law of
106. There is an additional problem with the sufficiently serious breach requirement in that
the language versions differ: in French it is une violation suffisamment caractérisée; in German
it is ein hinreichend qualifizierter Verstoß; in Italian it is una violazione sufficientemente
caratterizzata.
107. To that effect cf. Hedley Lomas, paras. 28–29; Haim, paras. 38–43; Rechberger, para
50, all cited supra note 19.
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the Court on the matter from which it is clear that the conduct in
question constituted an infringement.”108
In Dillenkofer, the Court held that in cases such as in Francovich, where a
directive has not been transposed in time, the breach of EU law is always
considered sufficiently serious.109 Outside these clear-cut cases, the key
question is whether a Member State has manifestly and gravely disregarded
the limits of its discretion.110A decisive factor for this assessment is the clarity
and precision of the rule infringed.111
Generally speaking it is for the national court to assess whether a breach of
EU law is sufficiently serious.112 The following discussion of German and
English cases will show that national courts are reluctant to find a sufficiently
serious breach. Only in evident situations, such as the complete failure to
transpose a directive into national law within the transposition period, or
where, in response to a preliminary reference, the ECJ has itself found a
sufficiently serious breach, will such a finding normally be made.113 In other
cases, the courts will often point to a lack of clarification by the ECJ. There is
a pattern in both English and German cases that where “only” an incorrect
transposition of a directive is at question, courts do not find a sufficiently
serious breach unless the legal situation had previously been clarified by the
ECJ.114 Courts will often rely on the ECJ’s decision in British
Telecommunications115 in order to argue that the Member State’s error in
transposing the directive was excusable. In particular, they tend to point to a
lack of guidance from the case law of the ECJ on the very question.116 It is true
that the ECJ’s case law on the sufficiently serious breach requirement is at
times difficult to follow and lacks guidance. But one can alsowitness a general
unwillingness of national courts to award the remedy.The following examples
will confirm these findings and will also point out some cases in which the
108. Brasserie du Pêcheur, cited supra note 4, paras. 56–57.
109. Dillenkofer, cited supra note 19, para 29; Brinkmann, supra note 19, para 28.
110. A.G.M.-COS.MET, cited supra note 19, para 81.
111. Synthon, cited supra note 19, para 39.
112. Konle, cited supra note 19, para 59.
113. OVGHamburg 1 Bf 90/08; OVGBerlin-Brandenburg 4 B 13.11; BGH III ZR 59/10; R
v. Deparment of Social Security, ex parte Scullion, [1999] C.M.L.R. 798; Byrne v. Motor
Insurers’ Bureau and another, [2008] EWCA Civ 574.
114. See cases in note 113 and 116 supra and infra.
115. British Telecommunications, cited supra note 19.
116. Ibid., para 44; BGH III ZR 233/07; BGH III ZR 127/91; BGH III ZR 337/09; OLG
München 1 U 392/11 and 1 U 5279/10; LG Köln 5 O 385/10; KG Berlin 9 U 233/10; BVerwG
2 B 93/11; Chalke and Another v. Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs,
[2009] EWHC 952 (Ch).
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national courts reached questionable results suggesting deficient knowledge
of European Union law and a reluctance to refer borderline cases to the ECJ.
An obvious misunderstanding of Dillenkofer117 is evident in a decision by
the Landgericht Düsseldorf concerning the non-implementation of the
Working Time Directives 93/104/EC118 and 2003/88/EC119 by the respondent
State of North Rhine Westphalia.120 The Landgericht came to the conclusion
that this did not constitute a sufficiently serious breach as the content of the
Directive was not clearly identifiable. In this case the Landgericht confused
the requirement in Francovich that the content of the rights contained in a
directive must be identifiable121 with the requirement of a sufficiently serious
breach. Rather it is a factor for assessing whether the directive confers rights
on individuals.122 It is a logical prerequisite that for a directive to confer rights
on individuals, these rights must be identifiable. Nonetheless, the overall
denial of a claim in State liability by the Landgericht was correct since the
plaintiff had failed to try and enforce his actual right to work less in the first
place, so a national procedural requirement stood in the way of success.
The decision of the English Court ofAppeal inR v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department, Ex p. Gallagher exposes some confusion surrounding the
meaning of “discretion” in theBritishTelecommunications case.123 Gallagher,
an Irish citizen, was expelled from the United Kingdom by the Home
Secretary on grounds of public policy. Article 9 of Directive 64/221/EEC
provides that an expulsion on such grounds may only happen after an opinion
by a competent authority had been obtained before which the person
concerned enjoys rights of defence and assistance.124 The Prevention of
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 did not contain such a
requirement and, accordingly, the Home Secretary never obtained an opinion
as provided for by the Directive. The Court of Appeal concluded that, while
there was a breach, there had been discretion in the implementation of the
Directive.TheCourt ofAppeal admitted that theDirective did not leave a large
degree of discretion to the Member State but that nonetheless it was given
some discretion. Regrettably, the Court of Appeal did not specify where that
discretion lay. It is true that, as the Court ofAppeal had pointed out, the law of
State liability was still at a formative stage when the decision in Gallagher was
handed down. Nonetheless, it is remarkable that the Court of Appeal
117. Dillenkofer, cited supra note 19.
118. Directive 93/104/EC, O.J. 1993, L 307/18.
119. Directive 2003/88/EC, O.J. 2003, L 299/9.
120. LG Düsseldorf 2b O 286/08.
121. Francovich, cited supra note 2, para 40.
122. Prechal, op. cit. supra note 81, 284.
123. R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R 951.
124. Directive 64/221/EEC, O.J. 1964, 56/850.
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considered that there was discretion.The Directive was unambiguous as to the
requirement of an “opinion” prior to expulsion. The only discretionary
decisions to be taken by a Member State regarding the opinion would have
been the designation of the body responsible for issuing it and by which
procedure it should be governed. But this was of no relevance to the question
before the Court ofAppeal. It was clear that Member States had no discretion
as to whether an opinion had to be obtained prior to expulsion. Since the Act
did not contain the requirement that an opinion be sought prior to expulsion
the transposition was obviously incorrect and should have been considered a
sufficiently serious breach.
The English High Court’s (Queen’s Bench Division) decision in the case of
(R) Negassi v. Secretary of State for the Home Department confirms that even
in seemingly clear cases national courts are reluctant to find a sufficiently
serious breach where the incorrect transposition of a directive is concerned.125
The case concerned access to work for asylum seekers underArticle 11 of the
Reception Directive 2003/9/EC.126 The applicant, an asylum seeker, had been
refused permission to work in the United Kingdom as he had previously
unsuccessfully applied for asylum, with the argument that Article 11 of the
Directive only granted access to work to first applicants. This construction of
Article 11 was held to be incorrect. In determining whether the breach was
sufficiently serious, the court considered another case where the UK Supreme
Court had held that the interpretation ofArticle 11was acte clair and therefore
no reference to the ECJ was necessary.127 Counsel for the applicant argued
that as a result, the breach ofArticle 11 was sufficiently serious. The court did
not accept this, however.The judge pointed out that the EuropeanCommission
had very probably been aware of the United Kingdom’s implementation but
had not done anything about it. The court accepted that this was a borderline
case. Remarkably it held that for this reason there was no sufficiently serious
breach and explicitly pointed out that the hurdle for an applicant seeking
damages is a high one. This case shows a clear reluctance on part of the High
Court to find a sufficiently serious breach, even though the Supreme Court
had considered this to be evident.128 Most interesting is its explicit argument
that the European Commission had been silent on the matter even though it
should have been aware of the way in which the United Kingdom had
implemented the Directive. This implies that the court would have expected
the Commission to initiate proceedings underArticle 258TFEU. From the fact
125. (R) Negassi v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2011] EWHC 386
(Admin).
126. Directive 2003/9/EC, O.J. 2003, L 31/18.
127. ZO [2010] UKSC 36.
128. In addition the court found that there was no causal link between breach and damage.
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that the Commission did not do so, the High Court appears to have inferred
that the breach was not serious. This line of reasoning demonstrates that the
High Court clearly did not regard Member State liability as a mechanism for
the enforcement of EU law, but only as a remedy for the compensation of
damage suffered by a private party.
This is confirmed by the German Bundesgerichtshof’s (Federal Court of
Justice) decision on whether Germany had incorrectly implemented Directive
2001/29/EC on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related
rights in the information society.129 Germany excluded broadcasters from the
distribution of proceeds from a levy on copying appliances and recording
mediums. While under German law the reproduction of material is legal for
personal use, the producers of appliances for making such copies and of
mediums for the storage of copies must pay a levy, which is then distributed to
the producers of works. Article 2(e) of the Directive explicitly includes
broadcasters as rightholders. Article 5 provides for exceptions to the
rightholder’s right to exploit their work, but any exception must not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder. It is difficult
to understand how the Bundesgerichtshof came to the conclusion that a
blanket exclusion of a whole group of rightholders from the distribution of the
levy could come within this narrow exception. The court further argued that
even if this were not the case, a breach would not be sufficiently serious. On
the face of it, blanket exclusion appears to unreasonably prejudice the interests
of broadcasters and would therefore constitute a clear breach of the Directive.
This case shows that the Bundesgerichtshof was both unwilling to find a
sufficiently serious breach and to make a reference to the ECJ for a
clarification of the matter.
This brief survey of the case law regarding the sufficiently serious breach
requirement shows a pattern that courts are unlikely to find a sufficiently
serious breach in cases, which deal with the incorrect implementation or
application of EU law. Only where there was a failure to transpose a Directive
in time or where the ECJ had previously established a breach will such a
finding be made. This is coupled with a conspicuous reluctance to make
preliminary references in borderline cases, which are instead decided in
favour of the Member State.
3.3. Causation and national procedural hurdles
The ECJ does not normally give guidance on the national courts’ decision
regarding the requirement of a causal link between the breach and the
129. Directive 2001/29/EC, O.J. 2001, L 167/10.
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damage.130 This is because it is usually a question of fact.131 As shown in
the above table, a number of cases have failed in the national courts because
the alleged damage was not caused by the breach. In the case of Negassi
discussed above, the High Court made the additional argument that the
applicant would not have found work in the United Kingdom even if the
Directive had been applied correctly.132 Surprisingly, the judge did not
forward any evidence for this but based it on a mere assumption that no work
would have been available for the applicant. The follow-up to the ECJ’s
Danske Slagterier decision133 by the Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional
Court) Köln is also instructive.134 Germany had violated its obligations under
several Directives regarding the importation of pork stemming from
non-castrated male pigs and rejected numerous consignments of pork from
Denmark.135 Danske Slagterier, an association of Danish slaughterhouses,
thus claimed damages because Germany had seriously breached EU law.After
a reference to the ECJ had been made, the Bundesgerichtshof, which had
referred the case to the ECJ, handed the case back to the Oberlandesgericht
Köln for further fact-finding. The Oberlandesgericht found against Danske
Slagterier because the alleged damage was not caused by Germany’s breach
of the EU Directive at issue, since the plaintiff was unable to prove that the
reduction in the production of pork from uncastrated male pigs was caused by
the illegal German behaviour. This is because the decision to reduce the
production of that meat had been decided before the Directive entered into
force. Thus it was not caused by failure to transpose it.
A similar argument was made by the same court in one of the cases
following Dillenkofer.136 It is recalled that the claimants in Dillenkofer were
holiday-makers stranded in their holiday destinations after their travel
operator had gone insolvent. Germany had transposed the Package Holiday
Directive 90/314/EEC137 late so that they were not covered by the protection
provided for, which included security of repatriation. In the case before the
Oberlandesgericht the package holiday contract in question had been
concluded before the transposition period for the package travel directive had
130. Brasserie du Pêcheur, cited supra note 4, para 65.
131. For rare exceptions cf. Rechberger, para 74 and Brinkmann, para 29, both cited supra
note 19.
132. See supra note 125.
133. Danske Slagterier, cited supra note 19.
134. OLG Köln7 U 29/04; the decision was handed down in March 2012 so that it does not
feature in the above statistics.
135. For more detailed facts, cf. Danske Slagterier cited supra note 19, para 11 et seq.
136. OLG Köln 7 U 23/97.
137. Directive 90/314/EEC, O.J. 1990, L 158/59.
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expired, so that it would not have been covered even if a timely transposition
had taken place.
The survey of case law conducted for this study has not been able to
establish a difference in the approach to causation between German and
English courts. This is perhaps due to the relative simplicity of State liability
claims when it comes to causation.
Restrictions on the State liability claim based on national procedural rules,
such as the domestic rules on procedure, evidence, limitation, and the
calculation of damages, are also in the domain of the domestic courts.They are
of course subject to the limits placed by the Court on the national procedural
autonomy of the Member States, which require that they must not be less
favourable than those applying to similar claims under domestic law
(equivalence) and they must not be so framed as to make it impossible or
excessively difficult to obtain reparation (effectiveness).138 Naturally,
procedural rules differ from one Member State to another, so that two
comparable claims in two different Member States may see different
outcomes. For instance, the limitation period for State liability claims in
Germany is three years whereas it is six years in England.139 While the case
law on the matters of causation and national procedural rules is not overly
instructive, it is nonetheless important to bear in mind that, in particular,
differences in national procedure can severely affect the suitability ofMember
State liability for the enforcement of EU law.140
4. Conclusions
This article aimed to test the assumption that the remedy of Member State
liability for infringements of European Union law, first introduced by the ECJ
in Francovich, should be regarded as a mechanism for the private enforcement
of European Union law. A statistical analysis of decisions by English and
German courts revealed that not many Francovich claims have been brought
so far and that very few have been successful.As indicated above, the findings
do not provide proof of the situation in other Member States, but they can be
regarded as strong indicators. Nonetheless, more comprehensive research,
138. Brasserie du Pêcheur, cited supra note 4, para 83; Palmisani, para 23 et seq.;
Transportes Urbanos, para 33 et seq.; Norbrook, para 111; Fuß, para 62; Combinatie Spijker,
para 91, all cited supra note 19.
139. § 195 BGB (German Civil Code); s 2 Limitation Act 1980 (c 58), cf. Spencer v.
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, [2008] EWCA Civ 750.
140. On the variety of approaches regarding the calculation of damages in the Member
States, cf. Granger, “National applications of Francovich and the construction of a European
administrative ius commune”, (2007) EL Rev., 180.
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including all Member States, would certainly be welcome.141 In addition, it
would be worthwhile examining the disciplining effect, which the possibility
of a State liability claim may or may not have on the Member States when it
comes to the implementation of directives in particular. An internal guide on
the transposition of directives by the BritishDepartment for Business warns of
legal challenges in national courts in cases of incorrect implementation,
explicitly referring to Member State liability.142 This suggests that the British
government was aware of the potential costs which may result from
Francovich claims. Interestingly, the latest version of this guide no longer
makes reference to the danger of Francovich claims.143 Moreover, Member
States still regularly violate their duty to transpose Directives in time, so that
the deterrent effect (if it exists) of such claims may not be great enough to
prompt Member States to get better organized in order to ensure a correct and
timely implementation of EU law. In some cases the potential disadvantage of
being exposed to a State liability claim may be outweighed by the benefits
which a government may believe to result from late transposition.144
Both the statistical findings and the analysis of national court decisions
made in this article suggest that Member State liability is not a successful
means of enforcing European Union law. The reasons for this can be
summarized as follows. The overall number of Francovich claims in the
national courts of England and Germany remains low. Over the past twenty
years, there were fewer than two cases per year on average in each of these
legal systems and the success rate remains relatively low. Even if one takes
into account, as Granger has convincingly suggested, that there was an initial
reluctance by applicants to seek and by courts to award the new and unfamiliar
remedy, it would need a significant rise in applications in the future to make a
difference.145 This article has attempted to answer the question why Member
State liability is so rarely successful. It is suggested that a number of factors
come into play, on the basis of which the limits of Member State liability as a
private enforcement mechanism can be shown. The conditions for State
liability set by the ECJ are very hard to satisfy and have not been clearly
defined by the Court. It is particularly difficult to establish a sufficiently
serious breach outside the clear-cut categories of non-transposition cases and
141. A start was made by Granger, ibid, who unfortunately did not provide a statistical
analysis.
142. Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, “Transposition guide:
How to implement European directives effectively”, Sept. 2007, para 3.16.
143. HM Government, “Transposition guide: How to implement European Directives
effectively”, Apr. 2011.
144. The European Commission detected 855 new non-communication cases in 2010, cf.
SEC(2011) 1094 final, cited supra note 37, Annex I, Table 1.1.
145. Granger, op. cit. supra note 140, 158.
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of cases where the breach persisted despite it having been established by the
ECJ. Where merely an “incorrect” transposition of a Directive is alleged, the
Directive’s vagueness, which is often compounded by differences in wording
in the different languages, provides a valid excuse. This means that State
liability is unfit to act as an enforcement mechanism in these types of cases.
This must be coupled with the decentralized nature of Francovich
proceedings. In addition, there is no evidence that Member State courts have
taken the private enforcement aspect of Member State liability on board and
regard themselves as EU courts.146 On the contrary, one can witness a
reluctance to make requests for preliminary references in borderline cases,
which would be necessary for effective enforcement to work. Furthermore, it
appears from the cases discussed and from the low success rates both in
England and Germany that national courts tend to decide borderline cases in
favour of the State. For these reasons, the attempt to empower citizens to
enforce EU law by giving them a remedy in State liability has not been very
successful.147
The findings in this study confirm an earlier study conducted by Slepcevic
on the possibilities and limits of private enforcement of compliance with the
Natura 2000 Directives.148 He concluded that access to the courts and a
common interpretation by the national courts are two crucial factors for
successful enforcement.149 In State liability proceedings, access to the remedy
is severely limited by the strict legal requirements set up by the ECJ.
Furthermore, the interpretation of EU law by national courts is not always
uniform, a situation for which the ECJ is itself partly to blame. Undoubtedly,
however, Francovich is a tool for individual compensation, albeit not a very
reliable one. Where complainants have managed to establish the conditions
and got around limitations laid down in domestic law, such as limitation
periods, their claims will be successful. This can be seen in the case of
Dillenkofer in the aftermath of which more than 7000 claims were settled as
well as in the case of Factortame, where a number of companies were able to
secure compensation. One can also conclude from some of the cases following
in the footsteps of Fuß that many individuals have been able to obtain
compensation on the basis of this judgment.
It is thus submitted that one should reconsider conceptualizing Member
State liability as a mechanism for the enforcement of European Union law. It
should instead be regarded as a remedy first and foremost for individuals.
146. This role was re-emphasized by the ECJ in Opinion 1/09 [2011], paras. 68–69.
147. Prechal, op. cit. supra note 81, 276 also doubts whether private parties are capable of
playing a role similar to that of the Commission in enforcement proceedings.
148. Slepcevic, “The judicial enforcement of EU law through national courts: possibilities
and limits”, 16 Journal of European Public Policy (2009), 378.
149. Ibid., 389–390.
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While Tallberg’s analysis that the Member States have emasculated Member
State liability could be regarded as an exaggeration,150 the same must be said
of Albers-Llorens’ designation of Member State liability as the “ultimate
indirect mechanism to secure Member States compliance”.151 It is thus
suggested to turn Caranta’s early analysis quoted in the introduction to this
article on its head.152 Rather than regarding individual judicial protection in
such cases as incidental, private enforcement ought to be regarded as no more
than an implication of the remedy providing compensation for individual
claimants where they happen to fulfil the strict requirements laid down by the
Court of Justice. This result would also be in line with the development of
Member State liability by the ECJ in parallel to the liability of the Union under
Article 340TFEU,153 the chief purpose of which is the protection of individual
interests.
150. Tallberg, “Supranational influence in EU enforcement: The ECJ and the principle of
State liability”, 7 Journal of European Public Policy (2000), 117.
151. Albers-Llorens, “The principle of State liability in EC law and the supreme courts of
the Member States”, (2007) Cambridge Law Journal, 271.
152. Caranta, op. cit. supra note 3, 725.
153. Cf. Brasserie du Pêcheur, cited supra note 4, para 53.
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